Self Assessment

Weekly Intelligence Report – 14 Mar 2025

Published On : 2025-03-13
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Weekly Intelligence Report – 14 Mar 2025

Ransomware of the week

CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team would like to highlight ransomware trends and insights gathered while monitoring various forums. This includes multiple – industries, geography, and technology – that could be relevant to your organization.

Type: Ransomware
Target Technologies: MS Windows

Introduction
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team has found Jett Ransomware while monitoring various underground forums as part of our Threat Discovery Process.

Jett Ransomware
Researchers have recently discovered a new ransomware strain called Jett. Once entered into the victim’s network, it encrypts files and appends the victim’s ID, email address, and the “.jett” extension. The ransomware also leaves behind two ransom notes: “info.hta” and “ReadMe.txt”.

Screenshot of files encrypted by ransomware (Source: Surface Web)

The Jett ransomware’s ransom note informs victims that their data has been encrypted using AES-256 and RSA-2048 encryption algorithms. It assures them that the files remain intact and can be restored.

To recover their data, victims are instructed to contact the attackers via email or Telegram. As proof of decryption, the attackers offer to decrypt up to two small, non- sensitive files for free.

The note also warns against any attempts to deceive the attackers, stating that doing so will result in an increased ransom demand.

Screenshot of Jett’s ransom note within the “info.hta” file:(Source: Surface Web)

Screenshot of Jett’s “ReadMe.txt” file (second ransom note):(Source: Surface Web)

Following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework

Tactic ID Technique
Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1106 Native API
Persistence T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
Persistence T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
Persistence T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
PrivilegeEscalation T1055 Process Injection
PrivilegeEscalation T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service
PrivilegeEscalation T1547.001 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution:Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
PrivilegeEscalation T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Defense Evasion T1014 Rootkit
Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion T1036 Masquerading
Defense Evasion T1055 Process Injection
DefenseEvasion T1070.004 Indicator Removal: File Deletion
Defense Evasion T1112 Modify Registry
Defense Evasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution
Defense Evasion T1218.005 System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta
Defense Evasion T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Defense Evasion T1542.003 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
Defense Evasion T1562.001 Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
Defense Evasion T1564.001 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
Defense Evasion T1564.003 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Window
Defense Evasion T1564.004 NTFS File Attributes
Defense Evasion T1574.002 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
CredentialAccess T1003 OS Credential Dumping
CredentialAccess T1056 Input Capture
Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery
Discovery T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1087 Account Discovery
Discovery T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Discovery T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
LateralMovement T1080 Taint Shared Content
Collection T1005 Data from Local System
Collection T1056 Input Capture
Collection T1114 Email Collection
Collection T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Impact T1485 Data Destruction
Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
Impact T1489 Service Stop
Impact T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Impact T1496 Resource Hijacking

Relevancy and Insights:

  • This ransomware specifically targets the widely used Windows Operating System, which is prevalent across numerous industries and organizations.
  • Detect-Debug-Environment: Debugging environments are used by developers to analyze and troubleshoot software. The ransomware uses this technique to determine whether it is operating in a debug environment. This feature aids the ransomware in avoiding analysis and detection attempts.
  • Calls to WMI: The ransomware is making calls to the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) framework. WMI is a powerful tool used by many legitimate applications and services, but it can also be exploited by malware to execute commands, collect information, or perform system modifications.
  • The Ransomware places itself in “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\” to manipulate the execution behaviour of the image. This registry key allows the ransomware to achieve persistence, silently execute alongside or instead of legitimate images, and maintain control over compromised systems, evading detection.
  • The ransomware’s attempt to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) indicates a deliberate effort to hinder data recovery options for victims.

ETLM Assessment:
CYFIRMA assesses that Jett ransomware may pose a significant threat across multiple industries and geographies due to its AES-256 and RSA-2048 encryption, multiple ransom notes, and persistent techniques like bootkits and DLL side-loading. Future variants may adopt stronger obfuscation and double extortion tactics, increasing risks for enterprises and critical infrastructure.

Sigma Rule
title: Delete shadow copy via WMIC threatname:
behaviorgroup: 18
classification: 0 mitreattack:
logsource:
category: process_creation product: windows
detection: selection:
CommandLine:
– ‘*wmic*shadowcopy delete*’
condition: selection
level: critical
(Source: Surface web)

IOCs
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise controls on your security systems.

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION

  • Implement competent security protocols and encryption, authentication, or access credentials configurations to access critical systems in your cloud and local environments.
  • Ensure that backups of critical systems are maintained which can be used to restore data in case a need arises.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATION

  • A data breach prevention plan must be developed considering, (a) the type of data being managed by the company; (b) the remediation process; (c) where and how the data is stored; (d) if there is an obligation to notify the local authority.
  • Enable zero-trust architecture and multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate the compromise of credentials.
  • Foster a culture of cybersecurity, where you encourage and invest in employee training so that security is an integral part of your organization.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATION

  • Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
  • Add the Sigma rule for threat detection and monitoring which will help to detect anomalies in log events, identify and monitor suspicious activities.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.

Trending Malware of the Week

Type: Remote Access Trojan | Objectives: Data theft, Remote Access, Keylogging |Suspected Threat Actor: Desert Dexter | Target Industries: Oil production, Construction, Information Technology, and Agriculture | Target Technologies: Windows, Crypto Wallet Browser Extensions, Crypto Wallet Applications| Target Geographies: Middle East and North Africa

CYFIRMA collects data from various forums based on which the trend is ascertained. We identified a few popular malware that were found to be distributed in the wild to launch cyberattacks on organizations or individuals.

Active Malware of the Week
This week “AsyncRAT” is trending.

AsyncRAT
Researchers discovered a malware campaign, active since September 2024, targeting the Middle East and North Africa, with Egypt, Libya, the UAE, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey among the most affected countries. The operation has been linked to a threat actor known as Desert Dexter, who uses fake news groups on social media to distribute malicious advertisements. These ads lure victims into clicking links that direct them to a file-sharing service or Telegram channel, ultimately delivering a modified version of AsyncRAT. This version has been enhanced with an offline keylogger, the ability to search for 16 different cryptocurrency wallet extensions and applications, and communication capabilities with a Telegram bot for further operations. Researchers identified around 900 potential victims by analyzing messages from the Telegram bot, including Device IDs and desktop screenshots sent to the attacker. Most of the victims appear to be ordinary users, with some employed in industries such as oil production, construction, information technology, and agriculture.

Attack Method
The attack begins with the creation of temporary accounts and news channels on Facebook. These channels are then used to post advertisements, which serve as bait to lure victims into the campaign. The attackers bypass Facebook’s ad filtering rules, which differ by country, allowing them to run deceptive advertisements without immediate detection.

Fig: Malicious AD Post Seen by the user

The ads contain links directing victims to Files.fm or Telegram channels that host a malicious file. A clear pattern emerges in the naming of these channels, as they are designed to mimic legitimate media organizations. Some of the names used include Libya Press, Sky News, Almasar TV, The Libya Observer, The Times of Israel, Alhurra TV, VoiceQatar, Step News Agency, Watan, Al Ain, and UAE Voice. This tactic helps the attackers appear credible, making it more likely for victims to trust and engage with the content.

Fig: Message containing a malicious archive in a Telegram channel

Technical Analysis
The attack follows a multi-stage infection chain, beginning with victims receiving a RAR archive via Telegram or an ad link. This archive contains either BAT or JavaScript files, which execute a PowerShell script to initiate the second stage. Notably, comments in the JavaScript file are written in Arabic, possibly hinting at the attacker’s origin.

In the next phase, the PowerShell script terminates specific .NET-related processes that might interfere with the malware’s execution. It then removes certain script files from system directories and places new VBS, BAT, and PS1 files to ensure they run sequentially. To maintain persistence, the script modifies registry settings, redirects the user startup folder, and logs a unique identifier for the malware. It also collects system details, captures a screenshot, and sends the information to a Telegram bot. Once the preparatory steps are complete, the malware executes its final payload in memory. It attempts to inject a custom C# reflective loader into aspnet_compiler.exe within the .NET framework directory. If the primary target is unavailable, it falls back to an older .NET version. This structured approach ensures stealth and persistence, allowing the attackers to maintain control over infected systems.

Fig: Infection Chain

This version of AsyncRAT has been modified to enhance its capabilities, particularly in targeting two-factor authentication and cryptocurrency wallets. It includes a tweaked IdSender module that scans browsers for a two-factor authentication extension and multiple crypto wallet extensions, including:

  • Two-Factor Authentication Extension:
  • Authenticator F2A (Brave, Chrome, Edge)
  • Crypto Wallet Extensions:
  • Binance Wallet (Chrome, Edge)
  • Bitget Wallet (Chrome)
  • BitPay (Chrome)
  • Coinbase Wallet (Chrome)
  • MetaMask (Brave, Chrome, Edge, Firefox, Opera, OperaGX)
  • Phantom (Brave, Chrome)
  • Ronin Wallet (Chrome)
  • TronLink (Chrome)
  • Trust Wallet (Chrome)

AsyncRAT also searches for installed crypto wallet applications, including:

  • Atomic Wallet
  • Binance
  • Bitcoin Core
  • Coinomi
  • Electrum Wallet
  • Ergo Wallet
  • Exodus
  • Ledger Live

In addition to targeting cryptocurrency assets, the malware features a basic offline keylogger. Using the SetWindowsHookEx function, it records keystrokes along with the active process name, storing the logs in %TEMP%\Log.tmp. This combination of credential theft and keylogging allows the attackers to steal sensitive information, potentially compromising both authentication processes and digital assets.

Dexter Link: Uncovering the Attack’s Origins
During analysis, researchers identified that some scripts used in the attack contained logic for system reconnaissance and communication with a Telegram bot. Screenshots from the attacker’s messages also revealed references to Luminosity Link RAT, a well-known remote access tool whose creator was arrested in 2018. While this RAT is no longer actively developed, some versions, including the one used in this campaign, remain accessible on GitHub.

Interestingly, a pattern emerged in the screenshots taken by the malware, which revealed that they were captured on systems named ‘DEXTER’ or ‘DEXTERMSI.’ Further investigation showed that once a chat with the attacker’s Telegram bot starts, victims are redirected to a channel containing ‘dexter’ in its title. The presence of ‘ly’ in the channel name, combined with geolocation data and Arabic comments in the PowerShell script, suggests a possible connection to Libya. The attacker’s channel also appears to promote hacked iOS applications, hinting at broader cybercriminal activities.

INSIGHTS

  • The AsyncRAT campaign linked to Desert Dexter highlights how cybercriminals are adapting their strategies to exploit regional vulnerabilities. By leveraging social media platforms like Facebook to distribute fake news ads, the attackers successfully bypass filtering mechanisms and gain victims’ trust. This campaign also demonstrates the increasing use of Telegram as both a malware distribution channel and a command- and-control hub, reflecting a shift away from traditional hosting methods. The ability to disguise malicious activity within popular communication platforms makes detection and mitigation more challenging for both users and security teams.
  • Beyond the direct financial impact, the attackers’ focus on stealing credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, and sensitive information suggests a broader objective. The presence of keylogging, screenshots, and data collection indicates that victims could be at risk for long-term exploitation. Stolen credentials could be sold on dark web markets or used in future attacks, creating a ripple effect beyond the initial infection. Moreover, the campaign’s deliberate targeting of the Middle East and North Africa suggests attackers are tailoring their tactics to regional online behaviors and security gaps, reinforcing the need for localized cybersecurity awareness.
  • The attribution clues in this campaign offer valuable insight into emerging cybercriminal operations. The repeated use of “Dexter” across attack components, combined with geolocation hints and Arabic-language scripts, suggests a regional threat actor rather than a global group. The reuse of older tools like Luminosity Link RAT also raises concerns about how abandoned malware continues to be repurposed for modern attacks, keeping outdated threats relevant. This campaign underscores the evolution of cyber threats, where past techniques blend with new delivery mechanisms to stay effective against advancing security measures.

ETLM ASSESSMENT
From the ETLM perspective, CYFIRMA anticipates that the tactics seen in the AsyncRAT campaign may expand beyond its current scope, targeting a wider range of industries and geographies. As attackers refine their methods, regions with increasing digital adoption and financial activity could become prime targets, especially industries relying on decentralized finance (DeFi) and cryptocurrency transactions. Malware operators may develop techniques to bypass evolving security measures, making detection more challenging. The use of social media and Telegram for distribution may extend to emerging platforms, increasing the difficulty of identifying and mitigating threats. Future campaigns might incorporate AI- generated deepfake content to enhance credibility and evade skepticism. Additionally, the repurposing of older malware with new delivery mechanisms could lead to more persistent infections that bypass traditional security solutions. This evolving landscape suggests that businesses will need to anticipate how cybercriminals adapt, moving beyond conventional defenses to stay ahead of emerging threats.

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

Recommendations:

STRATEGIC:

  • Deploy a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
  • Configure organization’s intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), or any network defence mechanisms in place to alert on — and upon review, consider blocking connection attempts to and from — the external IP addresses and domains listed in the appendix.

MANAGEMENT:

  • Implement real-time website monitoring to analyze network traffic going in and out of the website to detect malicious behaviours.
  • Regularly reinforce awareness of unauthorized attempts with end-users across the environment and emphasize the human weakness in mandatory information security training sessions.
  • Move beyond the traditional model of security awareness towards Improved Simulation and training exercises that mimic real attack scenarios, account for behaviors that lead to a compromise, and are measured against real attacks the organization receives.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Enforce policies to validate third-party software before installation.
  • Evaluate the security and reputation of each piece of open-source software or utilities before usage.

CYFIRMA’S WEEKLY INSIGHTS

1. Weekly Attack Types and Trends

Key Intelligence Signals:

  • Attack Type: Ransomware Attacks, Phishing, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Data Leaks.
  • Objective: Unauthorized Access, Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains, Espionage.
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Financial Loss, Reputational Damage, Loss of Intellectual Property, Operational Disruption.
  • Ransomware – Qilin Ransomware, RansomHub Ransomware| Malware – AsyncRAT
  • Qilin Ransomware– One of the ransomware groups.
  • RansomHub Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
    Please refer to the trending malware advisory for details on the following:
  • Malware – AsyncRAT
    Behavior – Most of these malwares use phishing and social engineering techniques as their initial attack vectors. Apart from these techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, defense evasion, and persistence tactics are being observed.

2. Threat Actor in Focus

The Escalating Threat of Blind Eagle: A Latin American Cybercriminal Group Focuses on Colombia

  • Threat actor: Blind Eagle
  • Initial Attack Vector: Phishing
  • Objective: Espionage
  • Target Geography: Colombia and Latin American countries
  • Target Industries: government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure
  • Business Impact: Operational downtime, data theft, potential destruction of sensitive information and financial loss.

SUMMARY
Blind Eagle, an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) group, has been actively targeting Colombian institutions and government entities since November 2024. Their recent campaigns are based on malicious .url files that exploit unusual user interactions, similar to the CVE-2024-43451 vulnerability. This vulnerability, which exposes a user’s NTLMv2 hash, allows attackers to authenticate as the user through pass-the-hash or relay attacks. Although Blind Eagle’s malicious files do not directly exploit this vulnerability, they initiate WebDAV requests to notify the attacker when the file is downloaded. Upon clicking the .url file, the malware payload is executed.

Following the release of a Microsoft patch for CVE-2024-43451 on November 12, 2024, Blind Eagle adapted by incorporating this .url file variant within six days. The group targeted Colombian judicial institutions and other high-value organizations, leading to over 1,600 infections during a campaign around December 19, 2024. The malware is typically delivered through legitimate file-sharing services like Google Drive, Dropbox, Bitbucket, and GitHub. The dropped payloads include .NET Remote Access Trojans (RATs) such as Remcos, packed using HeartCrypt for evasion.

The group also relies on social engineering techniques, notably phishing campaigns that impersonate Colombian banks, leading to the collection of sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII). The .url files initiate a WebDAV request to trigger the download of a .NET RAT, which communicates with a C&C server to deliver the final stage payload. This attack chain highlights Blind Eagle’s continued use of commodity malware tools and advanced evasion methods.

Despite security measures, Blind Eagle remains a potent threat due to its ability to exploit legitimate services for malware delivery, maintain persistence through underground crimeware, and adapt quickly to changing security landscapes.

Relevancy & Insights:
Blind Eagle has been targeting Colombian institutions since November 2024. In its recent campaign, Blind Eagle exploited unusual user interactions, similar to the CVE-2024-43451 vulnerability, by using malicious .url files to trigger WebDAV requests. These files, once clicked, deliver .NET Remote Access Trojans (RATs) like Remcos. Following the Microsoft patch for CVE-2024-43451 in November 2024, Blind Eagle quickly adapted to deploy this variant, infecting over 1,600 systems, including judicial and high-value Colombian organizations. The group has previously used social engineering and phishing, targeting banks to collect sensitive PII. Their use of legitimate platforms like Google Drive, GitHub, and Dropbox to deliver malware and evade detection aligns with their past tactics, showing continued evolution and persistence in exploiting new vulnerabilities. Organizations must strengthen security defenses to mitigate future attacks.

ETLM Assessment:
Blind Eagle (APT-C-36) is a highly active advanced persistent threat (APT) group engaged in espionage and cybercrime, primarily targeting organizations in Latin America, with a strong focus on Colombia. The group has been active since 2018, mainly targeting government institutions, financial organizations, and critical infrastructure, especially in Colombia’s judicial system and banking sector. It exploits Windows-based systems and uses sophisticated social engineering tactics to distribute malware, often leveraging legitimate file-sharing platforms like Google Drive, GitHub, and Bitbucket. Recently, Blind Eagle adapted to exploit vulnerabilities such as CVE-2024-43451, which exposes NTLMv2 hashes, although it mimics the vulnerability without directly exploiting it. The group has utilized various malware, including commodity RATs like NjRAT, AsyncRAT, and Remcos, while using advanced evasion techniques like packing with tools such as PureCrypter and HeartCrypt. The group’s tactics show constant evolution, with a focus on avoiding detection and refining malware delivery techniques. Moving forward, Blind Eagle is likely to continue evolving its attack vectors, targeting emerging vulnerabilities, and using sophisticated malware tools, making it crucial for organizations, particularly in Latin America, to implement strong security measures, including continuous monitoring, threat intelligence, and rapid patching of vulnerabilities to defend against this persistent and evolving threat.

Recommendations:

Strategic Recommendations:

  • Invest in Advanced Threat Detection: Integrate threat intelligence feeds into existing SIEM solutions to detect suspicious activities and anomalies related to Blind Eagle’s tactics, such as WebDAV requests, malicious .url files, and C&C communication patterns.

Tactical Recommendations:

  • Phishing Awareness Training: Conduct regular phishing awareness campaigns to educate employees, particularly those within high-risk departments like finance and judiciary, on identifying social engineering attempts and handling suspicious emails.
  • Malware Analysis and Evasion Detection: Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools to analyze malware payloads and detect advanced evasion techniques, such as those used by Blind Eagle (e.g., HeartCrypt packing, .NET RATs).
  • Patch Management: Ensure rapid patch deployment for vulnerabilities like CVE- 2024-43451 and other known flaws, especially those related to authentication protocols. The rapid adaptation of Blind Eagle highlights the importance of timely patch management.

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Operational Recommendations:

  • Regular Review of IoCs: Regularly update and review IoCs from our threat intelligence reports to ensure that security systems are tuned to detect Blind Eagle’s latest malware variants and attack infrastructure.
  • Incident Response Drills: Conduct incident response exercises specifically focused on Blind Eagle’s attack methods, including phishing campaigns, RAT deployment, and C&C communications, to ensure swift detection and mitigation.
MITRE FRAMEWORK
Tactic ID Technique
Execution T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1106 Native API
Persistence T1542.0 03 Pre-OS Boot: Bootkit
Persistence T1547.0 01 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence T1574.0 02 Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
Privilege Escalation T1055 Process Injection
DefenseEvasion T1014 Rootkit
DefenseEvasion T1027.0 04 Obfuscated Files or Information: Compile After Delivery
DefenseEvasion T1036 Masquerading
DefenseEvasion T1112 Modify Registry
DefenseEvasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution
DefenseEvasion T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
DefenseEvasion T1562 Impair Defenses
DefenseEvasion T1564.0 01 Hide Artifacts: Hidden Files and Directories
CredentialAccess T1056 Input Capture
Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery
Discovery T1018 Remote System Discovery
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1518.0 01 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery
Collection T1560 Archive Collected Data
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1095 Non-Application Layer Protocol
Command and Control T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
Command and Control T1571 Non-Standard Port
Command and Control T1573 Encrypted Channel
Impact T1496 Resource Hijacking

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

3. Major Geopolitical Developments in Cybersecurity

Iran is likely targeting UAE’s aviation and satellite industry.
Researchers have published a report on a highly targeted phishing campaign that targeted several aviation and satellite communications organizations in the United Arab Emirates, as well as critical transportation infrastructure. The threat actor, tracked by researchers as “UNK_CraftyCamel,” compromised an Indian electronics company that had a business relationship with the targets and used this access to send spearphishing emails tailored to each targeted entity. The emails were designed to deliver a custom backdoor.

ETLM Assessment:
The campaign used a technique to obfuscate payload content, which is relatively uncommon for espionage-motivated actors and speaks to the desire of the operator to remain undetected. While the campaign has yet not been attributed to any known threat actor, it is noteworthy that the TTPs overlap with previous operations tied to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

Silk Typhoon targets the IT supply chain, US indicts Chinese hackers.
Researchers have released a report on the Chinese espionage group Silk Typhoon, revealing that the group now targets common IT tools, such as remote management software and cloud applications, to gain access to systems. Once inside, they use stolen credentials to infiltrate networks and exploit various applications to carry out espionage activities.

Meanwhile the U.S. has charged 12 Chinese nationals, including two public security officials, in a hacker-for-hire scheme targeting American government agencies and others. According to the Justice Department, 10 of the accused led a decade-long hacking campaign for Chinese intelligence and police agencies, selling stolen data to government ministries. A Chinese company, i-Soon, allegedly facilitated these compromised data for $10,000 to $75,000 per email inbox.

The hackers targeted a religious group critical of Beijing, a human rights organization, U.S. media outlets, and foreign ministries in Taiwan, India, South Korea, and Indonesia. Two additional suspects were charged for separate for-profit cyber intrusions, including a hack on the U.S. Treasury Department in late 2024.

Officials said i-Soon had been a major player in China’s cybersecurity operations, employing up to 100 people and projecting $75 million in revenue by 2025. The suspects, believed to be in China, were not arrested. The Chinese embassy dismissed the charges, accusing the U.S. of unfairly targeting China over cybersecurity issues.

ETLM Assessment:
In the 21st century, data flows represent as much a vital lifeline to modern economies as naval shipping does and while privateering disappeared from the oceans, we increasingly see a similar concept being applied to cyber security in recent years. But these information flows on which our digitized economies are ever more dependent on are being raided by criminal groups, which have received “license to hack” from their governments. Indeed, the governments of countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, Russia or China are putting these digital privateers to work on their behalf in times of increased tension in international relations. In times like these we can expect increased institutionalization of digital privateers and their use for de facto undeclared warfare against enemies of the host government.

4. Rise in Malware/Ransomware and Phishing

The Qilin Ransomware Impacts Utsunomiya Central Clinic

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Healthcare services
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: Qilin Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; Utsunomiya Central Clinic(https[:]//ucc[.]or[.]jp/), was compromised by Qilin Ransomware. Utsunomiya Central Clinic (UCC) is a cancer treatment facility in Japan that specializes in diagnostic imaging and breast cancer screening. It offers cutting-edge imaging services, including 3T-MRI, PET-CT, and 3D breast tomosynthesis, for precise and early disease detection. The leaked data includes X-ray images, patient records, medical history, radiology reports, medical examination details, BOD secretary files, ECG and ECG Holter data, specialized medical tests, and various other medical information related to Japanese citizens. The total volume of compromised data is approximately 140 GB.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • Qilin (also known as Agenda) is a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group first observed in July 2022. It employs a double extortion method, encrypting victims’ data and exfiltrating it, threatening to leak it on their data leak site (DLS) if the ransom is not paid.
  • Qilin maintains variants written in both Golang and Rust, targeting both Windows and Linux operating systems.
  • Qilin affiliates gain initial access via social engineering attacks like phishing emails with malicious attachments and valid credentials that have been leaked or purchased.
  • In recent campaigns, Qilin ransomware has enhanced its encryption methods. The updated version, Qilin.B, utilizes AES-256-CTR with AES-NI to enable faster encryption on compatible hardware.
  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets countries, such as the United States of America, Canada, France, Spain, and the United Arab Emirates.
  • The Qilin Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Health Care Providers, Business Support Services, Heavy Construction, Manufacturing, and Construction.
  • Based on the Qilin Ransomware victims list from 1st January 2024 to 12th March 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by Qilin Ransomware from 1st January 2024 to 12th March 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, Qilin ransomware poses a significant threat to organizations of all sizes. Its evolving tactics, including double extortion (data encryption and leak threats), cross-platform capabilities (Windows and Linux, including VMware ESXi), and focus on speed and evasion make it a particularly dangerous actor.

The RansomHub Ransomware Impacts Japan Rebuilt Co., Ltd.

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Automobiles
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: RansomHub Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; Japan Rebuilt Co., Ltd (https[:]//www[.]japanrebuilt[.]jp/) was compromised by RansomHub Ransomware.

Japan Rebuilt Co., Ltd is a Japanese company specializing in remanufacturing automotive parts. The compromised data exceeds 200GB and originates from JRC’s personal computers, servers, and cloud services. It includes production data, audit records, financial information, payment details, contact lists, order information, customer records, internal documents, and other sensitive data.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • The RansomHub Ransomware group operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), allowing affiliates to leverage its infrastructure for attacks. They have adopted a “big game hunting” strategy, targeting larger enterprises that are more likely to pay substantial ransoms.
  • Recently we observed the RansomHub Ransomware group introduced remote encryption capabilities, allowing affiliates to encrypt data remotely via SFTP without running local encryption processes. This innovation complicates detection and prevention efforts.
  • The RansomHub Ransomware group engages in double extortion tactics, threatening to leak stolen data if ransoms are not paid. They have been known to target cloud storage backups and misconfigured Amazon S3 instances to exert additional pressure on victims.
  • The RansomHub Ransomware group primarily targets countries like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Canada, and Australia.
  • The RansomHub Ransomware group primarily targets industries, such as Heavy Construction, Business Support Services, Specialized Consumer Services, Health Care Providers, and Software.
  • Based on the RansomHub Ransomware victims list from 1st February 2024 to 12th March 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by RansomHub Ransomware from 1st February 2024 to 12th March 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to recent assessments by CYFIRMA, RansomHub ransomware has rapidly emerged as a significant player in the ransomware landscape since its inception in February 2024. This Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group has gained notoriety for its sophisticated tactics and cross-platform capabilities, targeting a wide range of sectors including healthcare, finance, and critical infrastructure. RansomHub’s success can be attributed to its ability to adapt and evolve, leveraging advanced evasion techniques and exploiting vulnerabilities in enterprise infrastructure.

5. Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Vulnerability in Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress

  • Attack Type: Vulnerabilities & Exploits
  • Target Technology: Modules and components for CMS
  • Vulnerability: CVE-2025-1702
  • CVSS Base Score: 7.5 Source
  • Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection
  • Summary: The vulnerability allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary SQL queries in database.

Relevancy & Insights:
The vulnerability exists due to insufficient sanitization of user- supplied data in the “search” parameter. A remote attacker can send a specially crafted request to the affected application and execute arbitrary SQL commands within the application database.

Impact:
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to read, delete, modify data in database and gain complete control over the affected application.

Affected Products:
https[:]//www[.]wordfence[.]com/threat- intel/vulnerabilities/wordpress-plugins/ultimate-member/ultimate-member-2100- unauthenticated-sql-injection-via-search-parameter.

Recommendations:
Monitoring and Detection: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify unusual system behavior that might indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.

TOP 5 AFFECTED TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WEEK
This week, CYFIRMA researchers have observed significant impacts on various technologies, due to a range of vulnerabilities. The following are the top 5 most affected technologies.

ETLM Assessment
Vulnerability in the Ultimate Member plugin for WordPress can pose significant threats to user privacy and security. This can impact various industries globally, including technology, finance, healthcare, and beyond. Ensuring the security of the Ultimate Member plugin is crucial for maintaining the integrity and protection of users’ data worldwide. Therefore, addressing these vulnerabilities is essential to safeguarding user profile management, registration, and membership functionalities on WordPress websites across different geographic regions and sectors.

6. Latest Cyber-Attacks, Incidents, and Breaches

RunSomeWares Ransomware attacked and published the data of Thai Metal Aluminium Co., Ltd

  • Threat Actor: RunSomeWares Ransomware
  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Leak, Financial Gains
  • Target Technology: Web Applications
  • Target Industry: Manufacturing
  • Target Geography: Thailand
  • Business Impact: Operational Disruption, Data Loss, Financial Loss, Potential Reputational Damage

Summary:
Recently, we observed that RunSomeWares Ransomware attacked and published the data of Thai Metal Aluminium Co., Ltd(https[:]//thaimetal[.]com/) on its dark web website. Thai Metal Aluminium Co., Ltd. is a leading aluminium extrusion manufacturer in Thailand. The company offers comprehensive one-stop services, including billet casting, extrusion die design, aluminium extrusion processes, cold drawing, anodizing, color-powder coating, assembly, and precision machining. The data leak, following the ransomware attack, encompasses sensitive and confidential records, originating from the organizational database.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:
RunSomeWares employs a double extortion model, both encrypting data and leaking it to pressure victims into paying ransoms. This approach is consistent with broader trends in the ransomware ecosystem, where groups seek to maximize leverage over their targets.

ETLM Assessment:
CYFIRMA’s assessment indicates that RunSomeWares is a relatively new ransomware group that emerged in February 2025, marking it as one of the latest entrants in the rapidly evolving ransomware landscape. The group’s activities highlight the ongoing trend of ransomware attacks surging globally, particularly in North America, where the number of victims has increased significantly.

7. Data Leaks

Bosowa Berlian Motor (Indonesian Company) Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data leak
  • Target Industry: Automotive
  • Target Geography: Indonesia
  • Objective: Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data sale related to Bosowa Berlian Motor(https[:]//www[.]bosowa[.]co[.]id/) in an underground forum. PT BOSOWA BERLIAN MOTOR Authorized Dealer of Mitsubishi Motors and FUSO in east Indonesia. Bosowa Berlian Motor is the Biggest Automotive Dealer in East Indonesia. PT BOSOWA BERLIAN MOTOR has more than 30 branches with 3S (Sales, Service, Sparepart) and BC (Body and Painting) Facilities. Service 24 hours a day with car- facilitated workshops and a reliable mechanic. The compromised data includes the website’s database and source code. The database, approximately 3.18 GB in SQL format, is being offered for sale at a price of $3,000. The breach has been linked to a threat actor identified as “LordVoldemort.”

Source: Underground Forums

Zendesk (THAILAND)/DEMETER ICT Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data Leak
  • Target Geography: Customer Relationship Management (CRM) Software and IT Consulting Services.
  • Target Industry: Thailand
  • Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to the Zendesk (THAILAND)/DEMETER ICT in an underground forum. Zendesk, a global leader in customer service software, has established a significant presence in Thailand through its partnership with DEMETER ICT. DEMETER ICT specializes in business transformation consulting services, focusing on workplace transformation, change management, customer experience management, and digital marketing. As an official partner of Zendesk, DEMETER ICT has successfully served over 4,000 enterprise clients across the Asia-Pacific region, deploying more than 2,500 customer service agents in countries including Thailand, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The compromised data includes user IDs, email addresses, phone numbers, personal contacts of company representatives, user audit logs, source code, company financials, and more. The breach has been linked to a threat actor identified as “DayCrypted.”

Source: Underground Forums

Relevancy & Insights:
Financially motivated cybercriminals are continuously scouring for exposed and vulnerable systems and applications to exploit. A significant number of these malicious actors congregate within underground forums, where they discuss cybercrime and trade stolen digital assets. Operating discreetly, these opportunistic attackers target unpatched systems or vulnerabilities in applications to illicitly gain access and steal valuable data. Subsequently, the pilfered data is advertised for sale within underground markets, where it can be acquired, repurposed, and utilized by other malicious actors in further illicit activities.

ETLM Assessment:
The threat actor claiming the alias “LordVoldemort” is reportedly involved in acquiring and attempting to sell sensitive data on various underground forums. This activity underscores the persistent risks posed by cyber threat actors who exploit vulnerabilities and engage in data theft. To mitigate these risks, organizations should implement robust security measures, including enhanced monitoring, secure data storage, and regular vulnerability assessments to protect against such malicious activities.

Recommendations: Enhance the cybersecurity posture by:

  1. Updating all software products to their latest versions is essential to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited.
  2. Ensure proper database configuration to mitigate the risk of database-related attacks.
  3. Establish robust password management policies, incorporating multi-factor authentication and role-based access to fortify credential security and prevent unauthorized access.

8. Other Observations

The CYFIRMA Research team observed that A threat actor operating under the alias “JumboJet” has allegedly breached the Indian business automation platform Basiq360, claiming to have exfiltrated a massive database containing sensitive sales, distributor, and payment information. The allegations surfaced on a dark web forum, where the individual posted details of what is purported to be over 3.5 million rows of data extracted from the platform.

According to the post, the alleged breach targeted Basiq360, a cloud-based sales and logistics tool developed by Abacus Desk IT Solutions, a Faridabad-based technology company specializing in QR-code sales tracking, inventory management, and anti-counterfeit solutions. The actor claims that the stolen database, approximately 600 MiB in size, consists of 183 tables, including detailed records of distributor networks, product pricing, order logs, and potentially sensitive payment transactions.

Among the most notable allegedly exposed data sets are:

  • Customer & Product Mappings: ~434,000 rows
  • Distributor Segments: ~323,000 rows
  • Regional Product Pricing: ~280,000 rows
  • Delivery Logs with Addresses: ~217,000 rows
  • Payment Records: ~135,000 rows (potentially medical or customer payments)
  • Real-time Push Notifications: ~110,000 rows

The individual behind the alleged breach describes the database as a “goldmine” for various forms of cyber exploitation, including fraud, phishing, and supply chain manipulation. The threat actor is reportedly offering the data for sale, with payments being requested in cryptocurrency.

Source: Underground Forums

The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to the Jaguar Land Rover in an underground forum. Jaguar Land Rover (JLR) is a leading global automotive manufacturer, recognized for producing luxury vehicles under the iconic Jaguar and Land Rover brands. The leak includes around 700 internal documents (development logs, tracking data, source codes, etc.) and a compromised employee dataset exposing sensitive information such as username, email, display name, timezone, and more. The breach has been attributed to a threat actor known as “Rey”.

Source: Underground Forums

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Attack Surface Management should be adopted by organisations, ensuring that a continuous closed-loop process is created between attack surface monitoring and security testing.
  • Delay a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
  • Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) in the overall security posture that acts as a proactive defence against external threats targeting unsuspecting customers.
  • Implement a holistic security strategy that includes controls for attack surface reduction, effective patch management, and active network monitoring, through next-generation security solutions and a ready-to-go incident response plan.
  • Create risk-based vulnerability management with deep knowledge about each asset. Assign a triaged risk score based on the type of vulnerability and criticality of the asset to help ensure that the most severe and dangerous vulnerabilities are dealt with first.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Take advantage of global Cyber Intelligence providing valuable insights on threat actor activity, detection, and mitigation techniques.
  • Proactively monitor the effectiveness of risk-based information security strategy, the security controls applied, and the proper implementation of security technologies, followed by corrective actions remediations, and lessons learned.
  • Consider implementing Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) security systems to compensate for the shortcomings of EDR and SIEM solutions.
  • Detection processes are tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events. Timely communication of anomalies and continuously evolved to keep up with refined ransomware threats.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
  • Consider using security automation to speed up threat detection, improved incident response, increased the visibility of security metrics, and rapid execution of security checklists.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defences based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Deploy detection technologies that are behavioral anomaly-based to detect ransomware attacks and help to take appropriate measures.
  • Implement a combination of security control such as reCAPTCHA (completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and Account lockout to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
  • Ensure email and web content filtering uses real-time blocklists, reputation services, and other similar mechanisms to avoid accepting content from known and potentially malicious sources.

Situational Awareness – Cyber News

Please find the Geography-Wise and Industry-Wise breakup of cyber news for the last 5 days as part of the situational awareness pillar.

Geography-Wise Graph

Industry-Wise Graph

For situational awareness intelligence and specific insights mapped to your organisation’s geography, industry, and technology, please access DeCYFIR.