Self Assessment

Weekly Intelligence Report – 04 Apr 2025

Published On : 2025-04-03
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Weekly Intelligence Report – 04 Apr 2025

Ransomware of the week

CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team would like to highlight ransomware trends and insights gathered while monitoring various forums. This includes multiple – industries, geography, and technology – that could be relevant to your organization.

Type: Ransomware
Target Technologies: MS Windows

Introduction
CYFIRMA Research and Advisory Team has found Spectra ransomware while monitoring various underground forums as part of our Threat Discovery Process.

Spectra Ransomware
Researchers have recently identified a new ransomware strain named Spectra, which is based on the Chaos ransomware family. Upon execution, Spectra encrypts files and appends a randomly generated four-character extension. It also drops a ransom note titled “SPECTRARANSOMWARE.txt”.

Screenshot of files encrypted by ransomware (Source: Surface Web)

The Spectra ransom note warns victims that their network has been infiltrated, with critical data—including financial records, customer information, proprietary software, and internal communications—encrypted. It further claims that backup systems have been compromised, making recovery impossible without the decryption key.

The attackers demand $5,000 in Bitcoin within 72 hours, threatening to permanently delete the data, leak sensitive information, expose security vulnerabilities, and conduct further attacks if payment is not made. They also caution that involving law enforcement or cybersecurity experts will result in immediate data destruction.

Screenshot of Spectra’s text file, “SPECTRARANSOMWARE.txt” (Source: Surface Web)

Screenshot of Spectra’s desktop wallpaper:(Source: Surface Web)

Following are the TTPs based on the MITRE Attack Framework

Tactic ID Technique/SubTechnique
Execution T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1106 Native API
Persistence T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Persistence T1176 Browser Extensions
Persistence T1542 Pre-OS Boot
Persistence T1542.003 Bootkit
Persistence T1543 Create or Modify System Process
Persistence T1543.003 Windows Service
Persistence T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Persistence T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Persistence T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Persistence T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading
Privilege Escalation T1053 Scheduled Task/Job
Privilege Escalation T1055 Process Injection
Privilege Escalation T1543 Create or Modify System Process
Privilege Escalation T1543.003 Windows Service
Privilege Escalation T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Privilege Escalation T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
Privilege Escalation T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
Privilege Escalation T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
Privilege Escalation T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading
DefenseEvasion T1014 Rootkit
DefenseEvasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
DefenseEvasion T1036 Masquerading
DefenseEvasion T1055 Process Injection
DefenseEvasion T1070 Indicator Removal
DefenseEvasion T1070.004 File Deletion
DefenseEvasion T1070.006 Timestomp
DefenseEvasion T1112 Modify Registry
DefenseEvasion T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
DefenseEvasion T1202 Indirect Command Execution
DefenseEvasion T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification
DefenseEvasion T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
DefenseEvasion T1542 Pre-OS Boot
DefenseEvasion T1542.003 Bootkit
DefenseEvasion T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
DefenseEvasion T1562 Impair Defenses
DefenseEvasion T1562.001 Disable or Modify Tools
DefenseEvasion T1564 Hide Artifacts
DefenseEvasion T1564.001 Hidden Files and Directories
DefenseEvasion T1564.003 Hidden Window
DefenseEvasion T1574 Hijack Execution Flow
DefenseEvasion T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading
Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Credential Access T1552 Unsecured Credentials
Credential Access T1552.001 Credentials In Files
Discovery T1010 Application Window Discovery
Discovery T1012 Query Registry
Discovery T1033 System Owner/User Discovery
Discovery T1057 Process Discovery
Discovery T1082 System Information Discovery
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Discovery T1087 Account Discovery
Discovery T1497 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
Discovery T1518 Software Discovery
Discovery T1518.001 Security Software Discovery
Collection T1005 Data from Local System
Collection T1114 Email Collection
Collection T1115 Clipboard Data
Collection T1185 Browser Session Hijacking
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Impact T1485 Data Destruction
Impact T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact
Impact T1489 Service Stop
Impact T1490 Inhibit System Recovery
Impact T1496 Resource Hijacking

Relevancy and Insights:

  • This ransomware specifically targets the widely used Windows Operating System, which is prevalent across numerous industries and organizations.
  • Detect-Debug-Environment: Debugging environments are used by developers to analyze and troubleshoot software. The ransomware uses this technique to determine whether it is operating in a debug environment. This feature aids the ransomware in avoiding analysis and detection attempts.
  • Calls to WMI: The ransomware is making calls to the Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) framework. WMI is a powerful tool used by many legitimate applications and services, but it can also be exploited by malware to execute commands, collect information, or perform system modifications.
  • The Ransomware places itself in “HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\ SOFTWARE \Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\” to manipulate the execution behaviour of the image. This registry key allows the ransomware to achieve persistence, silently execute alongside or instead of legitimate images, and maintain control over compromised systems, evading detection.
  • The ransomware’s attempt to delete Volume Shadow Copies (VSS) indicates a deliberate effort to hinder data recovery options for victims.
  • Ransomware utilizes extended sleep intervals to evade detection by security software, enabling it to operate stealthily and increasing the likelihood of completing file encryption before being identified.

ETLM Assessment:
The CYFIRMA assessment indicates that Spectra ransomware poses a significant threat across multiple industries and regions, with a clear focus on targeting enterprises. As ransomware continues to evolve, future variants are likely to incorporate stronger obfuscation and double extortion tactics, increasing risks for organizations—especially those in critical sectors.

Industries such as manufacturing, healthcare, and finance are particularly vulnerable due to their high financial stakes and the sensitive nature of their data, making them prime targets for threat actors.

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs section to exercise controls on your security systems.

Sigma Rule
title: Delete shadow copy via WMIC
threatname: behaviorgroup: 18
classification: 0 mitreattack:
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows detection:
selection: CommandLine:
– ‘*wmic*shadowcopy delete*’ condition: selection
level: critical
(Source: Surface web)

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATION

  • Implement competent security protocols and encryption, authentication, or access credentials configurations to access critical systems in your cloud and local environments.
  • Ensure that backups of critical systems are maintained which can be used to restore data in case a need arises.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATION

  • A data breach prevention plan must be developed considering, (a) the type of data being managed by the company; (b) the remediation process; (c) where and how the data is stored; (d) if there is an obligation to notify the local authority.
  • Enable zero-trust architecture and multifactor authentication (MFA) to mitigate the compromise of credentials.
  • Foster a culture of cybersecurity, where you encourage and invest in employee training so that security is an integral part of your organization.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATION

  • Update all applications/software regularly with the latest versions and security patches alike.
  • Add the Sigma rule for threat detection and monitoring, which will help to detect anomalies in log events, identify and monitor suspicious activities.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.

Trending Malware of the Week

Type: Trojan | Objectives: Financial Theft, Credential Harvesting, Remote Access | Target Industries: Banks, Crypto Financial Services | Target Technologies: Android OS, Cryptocurrency Wallets | Target Geographies: Spain, Turkey

CYFIRMA collects data from various forums based on which the trend is ascertained. We identified a few popular malware that were found to be distributed in the wild to launch cyberattacks on organizations or individuals.

Active Malware of the week
This week “Crocodilus” is trending.

Crocodilus
Researchers have uncovered Crocodilus, a newly emerging Android banking malware that signals a growing evolution in mobile financial threats. Unlike traditional banking Trojans, Crocodilus arrives fully equipped with remote control capabilities, deceptive overlays, and extensive data theft functions, making it a formidable weapon in the hands of cybercriminals. Initially observed targeting banks in Spain and Turkey, along with cryptocurrency wallets, this malware represents a calculated shift toward high-value financial assets, where the potential for damage is significant. Its ability to blend advanced attack techniques with social engineering tactics puts both banking customers and cryptocurrency investors at risk. As mobile malware continues to evolve, Crocodilus stands out as a highly sophisticated threat with the potential to reshape the mobile banking security landscape.

Attack Method
While the initial access method remains unclear, once it reaches the target device, the malware is installed using a specialized dropper that bypasses Android 13+ restrictions. Following installation, Crocodilus prompts the user to enable Accessibility Services, allowing it to gain deeper control and continue its malicious activities.

Fig: Requesting Accessibility Service

Once the user grants Accessibility Services, Crocodilus connects to its command-and- control (C2) server to receive further instructions, including which applications to target and the overlays to display. The malware operates continuously, monitoring app launches and showing overlays to capture user credentials as they interact with the targeted apps.

Fig: Credential Stealing via Overlays

A notable feature of Crocodilus is its use of deceptive overlays to target cryptocurrency wallet users. Once a victim enters their password or PIN, the overlay displays a message warning them to back up their wallet key within 12 hours. It falsely claims that failing to do so will reset the app, potentially locking them out of their funds. This tactic creates a sense of urgency, increasing the chances of victims complying with further malicious instructions. The overlay also guides victims to their seed phrase (wallet key), allowing Crocodilus to capture it using its Accessibility Logger. With access to the wallet’s recovery key, attackers can fully control the wallet and drain its funds.

Another data theft feature of Crocodilus is its keylogging capability, though it functions more like an Accessibility Logger. The malware tracks all accessibility events and captures anything displayed on the screen. This allows it to log all text changes made by the victim, making it similar to a keylogger but with broader capabilities. Additionally, it can execute RAT and bot commands, further enhancing its control over the device.

BOT Commands

Command Description
TR039OQ1QXZXS Enablecall forwarding
DearTetherDest Perform USSD request
MNKL9G0G9S1XZ Launchspecified application
GoodNightBro Self-remove from the device
TEB9F0S29KWQ Posta push notification
RT90SQ28X1Q Checkfor available overlays for installed applications
KingOnlyDear Send SMS to specified number
KingAllDear SendSMS to allcontacts
KingGetDears Get contact list
KingGetTs Getinstalled applications list
KingBoxSex GetSMS messages
allAdmGet Request Device Admin privileges
TBL03TSMLS Bulksend of SMSto specified numbers
TR9S0XZ Enableblack overlay
||SettingsNew|| Updatebot settings
||UpdateTr0x910|| UpdateC2 settings
||FreeApps||

No command, triggers check for created tasksto handle (including overlays download)

chzModes Enable/disable sound
mkLoper Lockscreen
CsxStx Enable/disable remote control session
NwSrx Enable/disable keylogging
mrSemploks Enable/disable self-protection against deletion
onlineData Listof enabled overlay targets
innaHotLive Enable/disable update of the target list
SpinderSpike Makeitself a default SMSmanager

RAT Commands

Command Description
InfinityGetTo Start front camera image streaming
InfinityGetStop Stop front camera image streaming
154856895422 Wake up device screen
TR2XAQSWDEFRGT Enable/disable “hidden” RAT
RightSlider Right swipe
LeftSlider Left swipe
Back_Action Perform “Back” action
Home_Action Perform “Home” action
Menu_Action Perform “Menu” action
864512532655 Down swipe
852147414735 Up swipe
15485666L2 Lock device
M55TRM321XA Mute phone and enable black overlay
PCROC9F9PCROC Enable sound and remove overlay
BL03902910AA Mute phone and enable black overlay
BLD10192OQXX Enable sound and remove overlay
clickScreen Perform click
trXSB123QEBASDF Perform complex gesture
O6155FI2SXZ Modify text in focused area
TCL9CLSKDLX12 Click a button
messagesLenght Write in focused area
TG32XAZADG Capture screen content for Google Authenticator app

One of Crocodilus’ RAT commands, “TG32XAZADG,” triggers a screen capture of the content displayed in the Google Authenticator app, using its Accessibility Logging capabilities to extract OTP codes. It records everything displayed on the screen, including OTP names and values, and sends this data to its command-and-control server, allowing attackers to bypass authentication measures in real time. With stolen credentials and personal information, threat actors can fully control a victim’s device using built-in remote access, enabling them to carry out fraudulent transactions undetected. To make this access even more discreet, Crocodilus overlays a black screen to conceal its activities and mutes the device’s sound, ensuring the victim remains unaware of the malicious operations.

INSIGHTS

  • The emergence of Crocodilus highlights a troubling shift in the sophistication of mobile banking malware. Unlike many other threats, Crocodilus incorporates advanced features from the outset, such as device takeover capabilities and remote-control functions, which enable it to operate with a level of stealth and precision typically seen in more mature threats. This suggests that the creators behind Crocodilus are highly experienced and have intentionally designed the malware to bypass traditional security measures. As such, it serves as a warning that cybercriminals are increasingly evolving their tactics, creating a more complex and dangerous landscape for mobile users.
  • Early Crocodilus samples contain the ‘sybupdate’ tag, hinting at a possible connection to the known threat actor ‘sybra.’ This actor has previously been linked to the MetaDroid fork of Ermac and other mobile malware families, including Hook and Octo. While it remains unclear whether ‘sybra’ is directly involved in Crocodilus’ development or merely a user of the malware, its presence in the growing mobile banking Trojan market raises concerns. Additionally, analysis of the source code suggests that the developers behind Crocodilus are likely Turkish speaking, offering further clues into the origin of this threat.
  • The use of deceptive overlays, like the false urgency around backing up a wallet, shows how cybercriminals are refining their manipulation tactics. By tricking users into believing they need to take immediate action, attackers increase the likelihood of successful theft, as victims are less likely to question the authenticity of the request in high-pressure situations. This blend of technology and psychological manipulation raises concerns about the resilience of users against such attacks.

ETLM ASSESSMENT
From the ETLM perspective, CYFIRMA anticipates that the evolution of Crocodilus signals a future where mobile banking malware increasingly targets high-value financial assets, posing severe risks to individuals. As attackers refine their techniques, fraudulent transactions and credential theft could become more frequent, especially in sectors handling sensitive financial data. With its ability to harvest information undetected, Crocodilus and similar threats may lead to widespread financial losses, forcing stricter security policies and regulatory scrutiny. In the future, its reach may expand beyond Spain and Turkey to a wider range of geographies, particularly regions with growing digital banking adoption and weaker security infrastructure. Advanced social engineering tactics, potentially enhanced by AI, will make deceptive overlays and fake notifications harder to identify, increasing the likelihood of successful breaches. As mobile malware continues to evolve, it’s clear that traditional defenses will no longer suffice, requiring continuous adaptation to mitigate these growing threats.

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

Recommendations:

STRATEGIC:

  • Implement Mobile Device Management (MDM) policy to enhance corporate data security by monitoring, managing, and securing mobile devices such as laptops, smartphones, and tablets that are used in enterprises.
  • Maintain an up-to-date inventory of all active software used within the organization and perform regular self-audit of workstations, servers, laptops, mobile devices to identify unauthorized/ restricted software.
  • Configure organization’s intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion prevention systems (IPS), or any network defence mechanisms in place to alert on — and upon review, consider blocking connection attempts to and from — the external IP addresses and domains listed in the appendix.

MANAGEMENT:

  • Security Awareness training should be mandated for all company employees. The training should ensure that employees:
  • Avoid downloading and executing files from unverified sources.
  • Incorporate a written software policy that educates employees on good practices in relation to software and potential implications of downloading and using restricted software.
  • Move beyond the traditional model of security awareness towards Improved Simulation and training exercises that mimic real attack scenarios, account for behaviors that lead to a compromise, and are measured against real attacks the organization receives.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defence based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Use multi-factor authentication (MFA) to mitigate credential theft and prevent attacker access. Keep MFA always-on for privileged accounts and apply risk-based MFA for normal accounts.
  • Evaluate the security and reputation of each piece of open-source software or utilities before usage.
  • Enforce policies to validate third-party software before installation.

CYFIRMA’S WEEKLY INSIGHTS

1. Weekly Attack Types and Trends

Key Intelligence Signals:

  • Attack Type: Ransomware Attacks, Vulnerabilities & Exploits, Data Leaks.
  • Objective: Unauthorized Access, Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains, Espionage.
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Financial Loss, Reputational Damage, Loss of Intellectual Property, Operational Disruption.
  • Ransomware – Cicada 3301 Ransomware, RansomHub Ransomware| Malware – Crocodilus
  • Cicada 3301 Ransomware– One of the ransomware groups.
  • RansomHub Ransomware – One of the ransomware groups.
    Please refer to the trending malware advisory for details on the following:
  • Malware – Crocodilus
    Behavior – Most of these malwares use phishing and social engineering techniques as their initial attack vectors. Apart from these techniques, exploitation of vulnerabilities, defense evasion, and persistence tactics are being observed.

2. Threat Actor in Focus

The Return of FamousSparrow: Researchers Unpack New Backdoor Variants and Tactics

  • Threat actor: FamousSparrow
  • Initial Attack Vector: ProxyLogon exploit
  • Objective: Espionage
  • Target Technology: Windows OS, Microsoft Exchange, IIS web servers, .NET/PowerShell, RDP/TLS
  • Target Geographies: USA, Mexico, Honduras
  • Target Industries: Finance, Government Institutions, Research Institutions, Hospitality, Engineering companies, and Law firms.
  • Business Impact: Data loss, Operational Disruption

Summary:
FamousSparrow is a China-aligned APT group active since at least 2019. It was recently observed targeting government institutions, financial sector organizations, and research entities across North America (United States), Central America (Honduras, Mexico), and other global regions. The group employs sophisticated tactics including exploitation of Microsoft Exchange vulnerabilities particularly ProxyLogon CVE-2021-26855 CVSS Score: 9.8, deployment of ASP.NET webshells, and use of a custom toolset featuring their signature SparrowDoor backdoor – now evolved into modular and parallelized versions. Their July 2024 campaigns revealed new capabilities including integration of the ShadowPad backdoor, advanced process injection techniques (hollowing colorcpl.exe), and refined persistence mechanisms through registry modifications and service creation while maintaining their characteristic use of DLL side-loading and RC4-encrypted payloads with hardcoded keys.

The group’s operations follow a multi-stage compromise chain beginning with initial access through vulnerable internet-facing servers, followed by deployment of webshells (such as s.ashx) that enable PowerShell-based post-exploitation activities including privilege escalation and lateral movement. FamousSparrow has demonstrated continuous toolset development, with their latest SparrowDoor variants showing significant improvements in code quality and introducing parallel command execution capabilities while maintaining overlaps with tools used by related groups like Earth Estries. Their infrastructure employs spoofed TLS certificates mimicking Dell products and utilizes a network of C2 servers (including 216[.]238[.]106[.]150 and 45[.]131[.]179[.]24) that have shown connections to both SparrowDoor and ShadowPad operations.

Recent attacks have revealed FamousSparrow’s expanding targeting scope beyond their original focus on hotels to include financial sector entities in the U.S. and government institutions in Honduras while maintaining their use of both custom malware and shared China-aligned tools alongside publicly available frameworks like PowerHub. The group’s evolving TTPs include memory injection techniques (particularly into wmplayer.exe), LSASS credential dumping using customized tools (dph.dll/msvc.dll), and sophisticated network communication patterns featuring parallelized command channels and proxy functionality. These developments, coupled with their adoption of ShadowPad – a backdoor typically reserved for Chinese threat actors – suggest potential resource sharing within the broader China- aligned threat ecosystem while maintaining distinct operational characteristics.

Relevancy & Insights:
The China-aligned APT group initially gained notoriety for targeting hotels worldwide, along with governments, international organizations, and law firms. Their early campaigns relied heavily on exploiting the ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855 CVSS Score:9.8) to deploy ASP.NET webshells and their signature SparrowDoor backdoor, which used XOR encryption and simple loader techniques like DLL side-loading (e.g., libhost.dll). During this period, they primarily employed open-source tools like PowerHub for post-exploitation and maintained persistence through registry modifications and service creation, showing a preference for targeting outdated Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers across multiple regions.

The group resurfaced in July 2024 with significantly evolved tactics, targeting a U.S. financial trade group and a Mexican research institute while expanding to governmental entities in Honduras. Their toolset now features two advanced SparrowDoor variants – a parallelized version mimicking Earth Estries’ CrowDoor and a modular plugin-based backdoor – alongside their first documented use of ShadowPad. Notable improvements include RC4 encryption, process hollowing (colorcpl.exe), reflective DLL injection (wmplayer.exe), and sophisticated C2 communications with spoofed TLS certificates. While maintaining their China-aligned profile, these developments demonstrate enhanced stealth capabilities and broader targeting beyond their original hospitality sector focus.

ETLM Assessment:
FamousSparrow has demonstrated consistent targeting of entities across North and Central America, with recent compromises including a U.S.-based financial trade group and a Mexican research institute, alongside historical attacks against government networks in Honduras. The group’s victimology reveals a strategic focus on organizations holding sensitive geopolitical or economic data, with particular interest in sectors like finance, academia, and government institutions. Their operations show a clear evolution from earlier hotel-sector targeting to more traditional intelligence-gathering objectives, suggesting alignment with broader state-sponsored collection requirements. The July 2024 campaigns against financial and research organizations indicate an expansion of targeting priorities while maintaining the group’s signature tradecraft around Microsoft infrastructure exploitation.

Technically, FamousSparrow employs a blended approach combining custom malware families like their signature SparrowDoor backdoor with shared China-aligned tools such as ShadowPad. The group’s toolset has matured significantly, with the latest SparrowDoor variants introducing parallel command execution and modular plugin architectures while maintaining consistent operational patterns like DLL side-loading (K7AVMScn.dll) and process hollowing (colorcpl.exe). Their continued exploitation of ProxyLogon vulnerabilities years after patching, alongside the adoption of newer techniques like TLS certificate spoofing (mimicking Dell certificates) and LSASS memory dumping (via dph.dll/msvc.dll), demonstrates both operational discipline and adaptive tradecraft. The group’s infrastructure overlaps with known ShadowPad networks while maintaining distinct C2 channels (216[.]238[.]106[.]150, 45[.]131[.]179[.]24), suggesting potential resource sharing within the broader China-aligned threat ecosystem.

Recommendations:

Strategic Recommendations:

  • Prioritize patching vulnerable Microsoft Exchange and IIS servers, especially for ProxyLogon (CVE-2021-26855 CVSS Score: 9.8).
  • Implement strict access controls and network segmentation to limit lateral movement.

Tactical Recommendations:

  • Monitor for DLL side-loading (e.g., K7AVMScn.dll, imjpp14.dll) and process injection (colorcpl.exe).
  • Block known C2 servers (43[.]254[.]216[.]195, 216[.]238[.]106[.]150) and inspect for spoofed TLS certificates.
  • Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging and Sysmon for detailed process/network monitoring.

Operational Recommendations:

  • Immediate actions:
  • Patch all Exchange servers (CVE-2021-26855)
  • Isolate systems showing signs of compromise
  • Investigation priorities:
  • Examine wmplayer.exe processes for injection
  • Audit %PUBLIC% directory for malicious files
  • Conduct memory forensics for reflective DLLs
  • Security controls:
  • Restrict PowerShell execution
  • Monitor startup folders and temporary directories
  • Limit service creation privileges
MITRE FRAMEWORK
Tactic ID Technique
Initial Access T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
Initial Access T1133 External Remote Services
Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter
Execution T1106 Native API
Persistence T1547 Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
Defense Evasion T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information
Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal
Defense Evasion T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
Credential Access T1003 OS Credential Dumping
Discovery T1083 File and Directory Discovery
Collection T1119 Automated Collection
Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol
Exfiltration T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

IOCs:
Kindly refer to the IOCs (Indicators of Compromise) Section to exercise controls on your security systems.

3. Major Geopolitical Developments in Cybersecurity

EU to toughen response to hybrid measures
The European Commission is set to enhance EU policing and law enforcement to counter threats from foreign powers like Russia that collaborate with criminal networks, according to a draft of a new internal security strategy. The document outlines plans to expand law enforcement powers to combat “hybrid” attacks by strengthening the EU’s capacity to tackle terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime, impose sanctions, and access banking information.

“Hybrid threats and open warfare are increasingly indistinguishable,” the document states, highlighting Russia’s “online and offline hybrid campaign against the EU and its allies.”The draft warns that foreign states “exploit crime as a service and use criminals as proxies” to infiltrate critical infrastructure, steal sensitive data, and prepare for future disruptions.

Key proposals include extending the EU sanctions framework—which currently targets terrorists and foreign actors—to include criminal networks and establishing an EU-wide system to track organized crime profits and terrorist financing. This would grant law enforcement broader access to suspect banking transactions.

This initiative to integrate and reinforce the EU’s internal security organizations coincides with Europe’s broader efforts to bolster its defense capabilities, reduce reliance on U.S. support, and address external threats.

ETLM Assessment:
In the 21st century, data flows represent as much a vital lifeline to modern economies as naval shipping does and while privateering disappeared from the oceans, we increasingly see a similar concept being applied to cyber security in recent years. But these information flows on which our digitized economies are ever more dependent are being raided by criminal groups, which have received “license to hack” from their governments. Indeed, the governments of countries like Russia, North Korea, Iran, and China are putting these “digital privateers” to work on their behalf in times of increased tension in international relations. Last couple of months we were able to observe increased institutionalization of digital privateers and their use for de facto undeclared warfare against enemies of the host government.

Chinese hackers conduct cyberespionage across APAC and Latin America
Researchers described cyber espionage activity by the China-linked APT Earth Alux, in which the threat actor is targeting the government, technology, logistics, manufacturing, telecommunications, IT services, and retail sectors across the Asia- Pacific and Latin America. The group typically gains initial access by exploiting vulnerabilities in exposed servers, then deploys its primary backdoor, dubbed “VARGEIT.” Earth Alux then maintains long-term undetected access while exfiltrating “high-value and sensitive information.

ETLM Assessment:
Both Asia and LATAM campaigns seem to be classic examples of state-driven espionage with many similar campaigns like it probably underway at the same time. The campaign is likely part of a broader Chinese strategy to gather intelligence on geopolitical developments and maintain influence around the globe.

Fake headhunting firms target US Federal workers in a Chinese spy game
Media reports have uncovered a covert Chinese tech company using multiple fake consulting and headhunting firms to target recently laid-off U.S. government employees and AI researchers. While its ties to the Chinese government remain unclear, the company’s tactics resemble those used in past Chinese intelligence operations.

Once recruited into the network, former federal employees may be pressured to disclose sensitive government information or suggest additional individuals for potential recruitment—whether knowingly or unwittingly. One fraudulent job listing, for instance, seeks an HR specialist with deep knowledge of Washington’s talent pool to identify candidates with policy or consulting experience and leverage connections within local professional networks, think tanks, and academic institutions.

ETLM Assessment:
Despite the Chinese Embassy to the USA claiming otherwise, the campaign bears all the hallmarks of classic state-driven espionage, including modus operandi often used by Chinese state-hackers. The US and China are in a technological race for domination of the future and will pull no punches or hesitate to use any tricks to get to the top. Thus, we should expect numerous similar campaigns to be ongoing at the same time.

4. Rise in Malware/Ransomware and Phishing

The Cicada 3301 Ransomware Impacts MinebeaMitsumi Inc.

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Manufacturing
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: Cicada 3301 Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; MinebeaMitsumi Inc. (https[:]//www[.]minebeamitsumi[.]com/), was compromised by Cicada 3301 Ransomware. MinebeaMitsumi Inc. manufactures machinery components and electronics devices including bearings and bearing-related products, defense-related special components, rotary components, LED drivers, backlight inverters, and measuring components. The compromised data includes confidential and sensitive information belonging to the organization. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 3.2 TB.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • Cicada3301 ransomware surfaced in June 2024 and is offered as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS). It is notable for being written in Rust, a programming language that enhances its stealth and performance capabilities.
  • Cicada3301 employs the ChaCha20 encryption algorithm, appending a random seven-character extension to encrypted files (e.g., a file named “1.jpg” might appear as “1.jpg.f11a46a1”). The attackers not only encrypt files but also exfiltrate sensitive data, threatening to leak this information if the ransom is not paid. They operate a data leak site to publish stolen data as part of their extortion strategy.
  • Connection to other Ransomware: There are notable similarities between Cicada3301 and the infamous ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware, suggesting that Cicada3301 may be a rebranding or a fork of the latter. Both utilize similar encryption methods and operational tactics.
  • The Cicada 3301 Ransomware group primarily targets countries, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and France.
  • The Cicada 3301 Ransomware group primarily targets industries, including Manufacturing, Technology, Consulting, Construction, and Business Services.
  • Based on the Cicada 3301 Ransomware victims list from 1st June 2024 to 02nd April 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by Cicada 3301 Ransomware from 1st June 2024 to 02nd April 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
Cicada 3301 Ransomware uses sophisticated methods to maintain access to infected systems, allowing attackers to run commands remotely and potentially return for future attacks. The ransomware can target both Windows and Linux systems, including VMware ESXi environments. Based on recent assessments by CYFIRMA, Cicada 3301 Ransomware is expected to intensify its operations across various industries worldwide, with a notable focus on regions in the United States, Europe, and Asia. This prediction is reinforced by the recent attack on MinebeaMitsumi Inc., a leading Manufacturing company in Japan, highlighting Cicada 3301 Ransomware’s significant threat presence in the Asia Pacific.

The RansomHub Ransomware Impacts O-M Ltd

  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Target Industry: Manufacturing
  • Target Geography: Japan
  • Ransomware: RansomHub Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Theft, Data Encryption, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Financial Loss, Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
From the External Threat Landscape Management (ETLM) Perspective, CYFIRMA observed in an underground forum that a company from Japan; O-M Ltd(https[:]//www[.]omltd[.]co[.]jp/) was compromised by RansomHub Ransomware. O-M Ltd is a Japanese manufacturer specializing in machine tools, particularly vertical lathes and other precision machinery. The compromised data includes confidential and sensitive information belonging to the organization. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 300GB.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • The RansomHub Ransomware group operates as a Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS), allowing affiliates to leverage its infrastructure for attacks. They have adopted a “big game hunting” strategy, targeting larger enterprises that are more likely to pay substantial ransoms.
  • We recently observed that RansomHub has partnered with SocGholish, a malware- as-a-service operation known for its “FakeUpdates” scheme, to target U.S. government entities. This collaboration involves using compromised websites to deliver RansomHub ransomware.
  • The RansomHub Ransomware group primarily targets countries like the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Canada, Brazil, and Australia.
  • The RansomHub Ransomware group primarily targets industries, such as Heavy Construction, Business Support Services, Specialized Consumer Services, Health Care Providers, and Software.
  • Based on the RansomHub Ransomware victims list from 1st February 2024 to 02nd April 2025, the top 5 Target Countries are as follows:
  • The Top 10 Industries, most affected by RansomHub Ransomware from 1st February 2024 to 2nd April 2025 are as follows:

ETLM Assessment:
According to recent assessments by CYFIRMA, RansomHub ransomware has rapidly emerged as a significant player in the ransomware landscape since its inception in February 2024. This Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) group has gained notoriety for its sophisticated tactics and cross-platform capabilities, targeting a wide range of sectors including healthcare, finance, and critical infrastructure. RansomHub’s success can be attributed to its ability to adapt and evolve, leveraging advanced evasion techniques and exploiting vulnerabilities in enterprise infrastructure.

5. Vulnerabilities and Exploits

Vulnerability in Beego

  • Attack Type: Vulnerabilities & Exploits
  • Target Technology: Modules and components for CMS
  • Vulnerability: CVE-2025-30223
  • CVSS Base Score: 9.3 Source
  • Vulnerability Type: Cross-site Scripting
  • Summary: The disclosed vulnerability allows a remote attacker to perform cross- site scripting (XSS) attacks.

Relevancy & Insights:
The vulnerability exists due to insufficient sanitization of user- supplied data in the “RenderForm()” function. A remote attacker can trick the victim to follow a specially crafted link and execute arbitrary HTML and script code in user’s browser in the context of a vulnerable website.

Impact:
Successful exploitation of this vulnerability may allow a remote attacker to steal potentially sensitive information, change the appearance of the web page, and perform phishing and drive-by-download attacks.

Affected Products: https[:]//github[.]com/beego/beego/security/advisories/GHSA-2j42- h78h-q4fg

Recommendations:
Monitoring and Detection: Implement monitoring and detection mechanisms to identify unusual system behavior that might indicate an attempted exploitation of this vulnerability.

TOP 5 AFFECTED TECHNOLOGIES OF THE WEEK
This week, CYFIRMA researchers have observed significant impacts on various technologies, due to a range of vulnerabilities. The following are the top 5 most affected technologies.

ETLM Assessment
Vulnerability in Beego can pose significant threats to user privacy and security. This can impact various industries globally, including technology, finance, and enterprise application development. Ensuring the security of Beego is crucial for maintaining the integrity and protection of users’ data worldwide. Therefore, addressing these vulnerabilities is essential to safeguarding the rapid development of enterprise applications, including RESTful APIs, web applications, and backend services, across different geographic regions and sectors.

6. Latest Cyber-Attacks, Incidents, and Breaches

NightSpire Ransomware attacked and published the data of Raja Ferry Port Public Company Limited

  • Threat Actor: NightSpire Ransomware
  • Attack Type: Ransomware
  • Objective: Data Leak, Financial Gains
  • Target Technology: Web Applications
  • Target Industry: Transportation
  • Target Geography: Thailand
  • Business Impact: Operational Disruption, Data Loss, Financial Loss, Potential Reputational Damage

Summary:
Recently, we observed that NightSpire Ransomware attacked and published the data of Raja Ferry Port Public Company Limited(https[:]//www[.]rajaferryport[.]com/) on its dark web website. Raja Ferry Port Public Company Limited Thailand is a leading provider of ferry services in the country. Raja Ferry Port offers wharf services and engages in the trade of wharf and passenger ferryboats. The company also provides logistics solutions, including the transportation of fresh produce and fuel products for the private sector. The data leak, following the ransomware attack, encompasses sensitive and confidential records, originating from the organizational database. The total size of the compromised data is approximately 100 GB.

Source: Dark Web

Relevancy & Insights:

  • NightSpire employs a double extortion strategy, encrypting data and threatening to leak stolen information unless a ransom is paid. This approach is typical of modern ransomware groups and adds pressure on victims to comply with demands.
  • NightSpire’s operations show strong influences from existing Ransomware-as-a- Service (RaaS) models, suggesting they might be an emerging group or a rebrand of an existing actor.

ETLM Assessment:
According to CYFIRMA’s assessment, NightSpire is a new ransomware group that emerged in early 2025, marking itself as a formidable player in the rapidly evolving ransomware landscape. Despite its recent appearance, NightSpire has already gained attention for its aggressive tactics and well-structured operations.

7. Data Leaks

PetroERP India Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data leak
  • Target Industry: Oil & Gas
  • Target Geography: India
  • Objective: Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to PetroERP India (https[:]//petroerp[.]in/) in an underground forum. PetroERP is a comprehensive cloud-based Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) solution specifically designed for petrol pump management in India. The compromised data includes accounting ledgers, alert types, app menus, app modules, app versions, banks, bank payments, bills, bill cycles, bill formats, and other sensitive and confidential information. The total size of the breached data is approximately 193 MB (compressed). The breach has been linked to a threat actor identified as “LordVoldemort.”

Source: Underground Forums

PPSDM KEMENDAGRI REGIONAL BANDUNG Data Advertised on a Leak Site

  • Attack Type: Data Leak
  • Target Industry: Government
  • Target Geography: Indonesia
  • Objective: Data Theft, Financial Gains
  • Business Impact: Data Loss, Reputational Damage

Summary:
The CYFIRMA Research team observed a data leak related to the PPSDM KEMENDAGRI REGIONAL BANDUNG (https[:]//ppsdmregbandung[.]kemendagri[.]go[.]id/) in an underground forum. Pusat Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia (PPSDM) Kementerian Dalam Negeri Regional Bandung is a governmental institution under Indonesia’s Ministry of Home Affairs (Kemendagri) dedicated to enhancing the competencies of civil servants (Aparatur Sipil Negara or ASN) within regional administrations. The compromised data includes admin, member data, book data, visitor records, acquisition records, and loan transactions. The breach has been linked to a threat actor identified as “saTaoz.”

Source: Underground Forums

Relevancy & Insights:
Financially motivated cybercriminals are continuously scouring for exposed and vulnerable systems and applications to exploit. A significant number of these malicious actors congregate within underground forums, where they discuss cybercrime and trade stolen digital assets. Operating discreetly, these opportunistic attackers target unpatched systems or vulnerabilities in applications to illicitly gain access and steal valuable data. Subsequently, the pilfered data is advertised for sale within underground markets, where it can be acquired, repurposed, and utilized by other malicious actors in further illicit activities.

ETLM Assessment:
The threat actor claiming the alias “Lord Voldemort” is reportedly involved in acquiring and attempting to sell sensitive data on various underground forums. This activity underscores the persistent risks posed by cyber threat actors who exploit vulnerabilities and engage in data theft. To mitigate these risks, organizations should implement robust security measures, including enhanced monitoring, secure data storage, and regular vulnerability assessments to protect against such malicious activities.

Recommendations: Enhance the cybersecurity posture by:

  1. Updating all software products to their latest versions is essential to mitigate the risk of vulnerabilities being exploited.
  2. Ensure proper database configuration to mitigate the risk of database-related attacks.
  3. Establish robust password management policies, incorporating multi-factor authentication and role-based access to fortify credential security and prevent unauthorized access.

8. Other Observations

The CYFIRMA Research team observed that a threat actor allegedly offers ERP access to companies in UAE, South Africa, India, Egypt, and the US, spanning several industries including hospitality, pharma, manufacturing & energy.

Source: Underground Forums

The CYFIRMA Research team observed that a threat actor has allegedly leaked a database containing GitHub user information on a dark web forum, claiming to have obtained thousands of usernames and emails. While the authenticity of the data remains unverified, the post suggests that the information includes details on high-value GitHub accounts, including OG usernames and top contributors.

According to the forum post, the alleged leak consists of two files: “OG.txt,” which reportedly contains 3,765 lines of usernames and emails belonging to accounts with potentially high resale value, and “Results.txt,” which allegedly includes 826 lines of data on GitHub users with notable contributions and over 1,000 followers

Source: Underground Forums

STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Attack Surface Management should be adopted by organisations, ensuring that a continuous closed-loop process is created between attack surface monitoring and security testing.
  • Delay a unified threat management strategy – including malware detection, deep learning neural networks, and anti-exploit technology – combined with vulnerability and risk mitigation processes.
  • Incorporate Digital Risk Protection (DRP) in the overall security posture that acts as a proactive defence against external threats targeting unsuspecting customers.
  • Implement a holistic security strategy that includes controls for attack surface reduction, effective patch management, and active network monitoring, through next-generation security solutions and a ready-to-go incident response plan.
  • Create risk-based vulnerability management with deep knowledge about each asset. Assign a triaged risk score based on the type of vulnerability and criticality of the asset to help ensure that the most severe and dangerous vulnerabilities are dealt with first.

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Take advantage of global Cyber Intelligence providing valuable insights on threat actor activity, detection, and mitigation techniques.
  • Proactively monitor the effectiveness of risk-based information security strategy, the security controls applied, and the proper implementation of security technologies, followed by corrective actions remediations, and lessons learned.
  • Consider implementing Network Traffic Analysis (NTA) and Network Detection and Response (NDR) security systems to compensate for the shortcomings of EDR and SIEM solutions.
  • Detection processes are tested to ensure awareness of anomalous events. Timely communication of anomalies and continuously evolved to keep up with refined ransomware threats.

TACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS

  • Patch software/applications as soon as updates are available. Where feasible, automated remediation should be deployed since vulnerabilities are one of the top attack vectors.
  • Consider using security automation to speed up threat detection, improved incident response, increased the visibility of security metrics, and rapid execution of security checklists.
  • Build and undertake safeguarding measures by monitoring/ blocking the IOCs and strengthening defences based on the tactical intelligence provided.
  • Deploy detection technologies that are behavioral anomaly-based to detect ransomware attacks and help to take appropriate measures.
  • Implement a combination of security control such as reCAPTCHA (completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart), Device fingerprinting, IP backlisting, Rate-limiting, and Account lockout to thwart automated brute-force attacks.
  • Ensure email and web content filtering uses real-time blocklists, reputation services, and other similar mechanisms to avoid accepting content from known and potentially malicious sources.

Situational Awareness – Cyber News

Please find the Geography-Wise and Industry-Wise breakup of cyber news for the last 5 days as part of the situational awareness pillar.

Geography-Wise Graph

Industry-Wise Graph

For situational awareness intelligence and specific insights mapped to your organisation’s geography, industry, and technology, please access DeCYFIR